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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Bree Leann Larosa appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
her conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Coeur d'Alene patrol officer Craig Buhl effectuated a traffic stop on a
vehicle he observed speeding and failing to use a turn signal. (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-5.)
Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Buhl observed that the driver, Larosa, was
nervous, and had bloodshot eyes and sores on her face. (Tr., p.9, L.16 - p.11,
L.25.) Officer Buhl also learned that Larosa's driver's license was suspended
and she did not have insurance on the vehicle. (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-18.) Based upon
Larosa's appearance and demeanor, Officer Buhl suspected Larosa of being
under the influence of a controlled substance, and asked her to exit the vehicle.
(Tr., p.12, Ls.1-23.)
Larosa told Officer Buhl that she used methamphetamine three days
earlier and had subsequently slept for three days. (Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.6.)
She also told him that she had a son who had been removed from her home, and
who was the subject of a pending child protection proceeding. (R., p.22.) Larosa
eventually admitted to Officer Buhl that she had a syringe in her vehicle that she
used to inject methamphetamine.

(Tr., p.15, L.7 - p.16, L.9.)

Larosa gave

Officer Buhl consent to search her vehicle, and Officer Buhl recovered the
syringe.

(Tr., p.17, Ls.1-22.)

Officer Buhl elected not to arrest Larosa, but
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informed her that he was going to have the syringe tested for the presence of
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-24.)
The next day, Officer Buhl's supervisor asked him to visit Larosa's house
to make sure there were no additional children there who may be endangered.
(Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.19, L.16.)

Officer Buhl and Officer Hanna then went to

Larosa's residence. (Tr., p.19, L.17 - p.20, L.9.) Officer Buhl knocked at one
door, and Officer Hanna stood at another. (Tr., p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.14.) Larosa
answered the door at which Officer Buhl was knocking and gave him consent to
enter. (Tr., p.21, L.15- p.22, L.16.) Larosa told Officer Buhl that her roommate
and her boyfriend, Ryan Peppers, were also in the house. (Tr., p.24, Ls.13-19.)
It was determined by the officers that Peppers was currently on felony probation.
(Tr., p.26, Ls.4-9.)
After Officer Buhl expressed his concern about the possible presence of
children at the residence, Larosa took Officer Buhl to a back bedroom where a
child was sleeping. (Tr., p.23, L.2 - p.24, L.12; p.26, L.12 - p.27, L.1.) From this
location, Officer Buhl saw, through an open door, a man sitting down in another
bedroom.

(Tr., p.27, Ls.2-8.)

Larosa told Officer Buhl the man was her

boyfriend, Peppers. (Tr., p.27, Ls.9-13.) Officer Buhl asked Larosa if he could
speak with Peppers, and Larosa replied that he could.

(Tr., p.27, Ls.14-17.)

Officer Buhl then asked Larosa if he could enter the room Peppers was in. (Tr.,
p.28, Ls.17-18.)

Larosa responded by standing up and walking into the room

occupied by Peppers. (Tr., p.28, Ls.19-22.) Officer Buhl followed her and stood
just inside the door of the room. (Tr., p.28, Ls.21-25.)
2

From this position, and while speaking with Peppers, Officer Buhl saw a
glass pipe in plain view on a dresser. (Tr., p.29, Ls.8-18.) Larosa told Officer
Buhl that it was a marijuana pipe and that it was hers.

(Tr., p.29, Ls.19-25.)

Larosa then consented to Officer Buhl's request to search the rest of the room.
(Tr., p.30, L.18 - p.31, L.7.)

Officer Buhl searched the room and found

marijuana, syringes, and a spoon with white residue. (Tr., p.31, L.8 - p.34, L.13.)
The state charged Larosa with possession of methamphetamine,
misdemeanor injury to child, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.77-79.) Larosa made a motion to suppress the controlled
substances and paraphernalia found in her house.

(R., pp.92-116.)

After a

hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.144-145; Tr., p.6, L.5- p.75,
L.12.)
Pursuant to plea agreement, Larosa entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of methamphetamine, preserving her right to appeal the district
court's denial of her motion to suppress. (R., p.147; Tr., p.78, L.15 - p.84, L.7.)
The state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.153-155.) The district court
imposed a unified three-year sentence with one and one-half years fixed, but
suspended the sentence and placed Larosa on probation for two years.
pp.156-160.) Larosa timely appealed. (R., pp.171-174.)
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ISSUE
Larosa states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Larosa's motion
to suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Larosa failed to show clear error in the district court's factual finding
that Larosa voluntarily consented to the officers' entry to and search of her
house?
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ARGUMENT
Larosa Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Factual Finding
That Larosa Voluntarily Consented To The Officers' Entry To And Search Of Her
House
A.

Introduction
Larosa contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to

suppress evidence found in her house during a child welfare check.

(See

generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Larosa contends that the district court
erred in concluding that the consent she gave officers to enter and search her
house was voluntary and not coerced. (Id.) However, the record supports the
district court's determination.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108,
110 (Ct. App. 2003).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Larosa's Consent To the
Officers' Entry To And Search of Her House Was Voluntary
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal

and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693,
695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)).
Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,
852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a
question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.

ill

at 848, 852, 26 P.3d at 35; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S.

218, 225-226 (1973)).

In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of

duress or coercion, either direct or implied.

Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 228. A

voluntary decision is one that is "the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker."

ill

at 225.

An individual's consent is

involuntary, on the other hand, "if his will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired." State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137
P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 225). The mere
presence of officers asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of
law, to constitute improper police duress or coercion.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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See United States v.

As the Idaho Court of Appeals explained in State v. Rector, 144 Idaho
643, 646, 167 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2006), a trial court's factual determination
regarding consent is entitled to deference:
The trial court is the proper forum for the "careful sifting of
the unique facts and circumstances of each case" necessary in
determining voluntariness. Even though the evidence may be
equivocal and somewhat in dispute, if the trial court's finding of fact
is based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
record, it will not be disturbed on appeal. In short, whether a
consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, and our
standard of review requires that we accept a trial court's factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings will not be
deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
(Citations omitted.)
Applying these principles to the evidence before it, the district court
correctly concluded that Larosa voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into
her house and to their search of the bedroom. (Tr., p.73, L.21 - p.75, L.3.) The
court specifically found that Officer Buhl's testimony describing Larosa's consent
was credible, and that there was nothing to indicate that this consent was
coerced. (Tr., p.73, L.24 - p.75, L.3.) There were only two officers present at
Larosa's residence, and Officer Buhl, who made the requests to enter and search
the house, did not raise his voice when addressing Larosa. (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-13.)
On appeal, Larosa does not dispute the district court's conclusion that she
consented to the entry and search of her house, but instead contends that this
consent was not voluntary because it was coerced by the officers. (Appellant's
brief, pp.7-9.) Specifically, Larosa argues that this coercion was demonstrated
by: the officers' late night arrival to her house, the positioning of one officer at
7

each of two separate doors outside her residence, Officer Buhl being armed, and
her recognition of Officer Buhl as the officer who pulled her over the previous
evening. (Id.) However, these factors fail to demonstrate that the district court
erred in concluding that Larosa's consent was voluntary.
Officers Buhl and Hanna arrived at Larosa's residence at 11 :45 pm. (Tr.,
p.47, Ls.4-19.)

While time of day can be a factor in determining whether a

defendant's consent was voluntary, see U.S. v. Quintero, 648 F.3d 660, 667-668
(8th Cir. 2011 ), Larosa has not attempted to articulate how the officers' relatively
late arrival in this case coerced her into consenting to their request to enter her
house and search the bedroom.

There is no indication from the record that

Larosa was asleep when the officers arrived, or that she was in some other
mental or physical state that would have hindered her ability to voluntarily
consent to Officer Buhl's requests. Without such context, the mere lateness of
the officers' arrival is, at best, of only minimally persuasive value in supporting
Larosa's contention that she was coerced.
Upon arrival at the residence, Officer Buhl went to one door, and Officer
Hanna went to the other. (Tr., p.21, Ls.1-14.)

Officer Buhl knocked on the door

where he was positioned and Larosa answered that door.

(Id.)

Larosa's

contention that this positioning of the officers was coercive is belied by the fact
that there is no indication from the record that Larosa even knew of the presence
of Officer Hanna outside the second door before she made contact with Officer
Buhl. In any event, the simple strategic positioning of two officers outside of a
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house is not so overbearing as to render subsequent consent offered by the
resident of that house involuntary.
Next, while Officer Buhl was armed, he never drew his weapon during his
contact with Larosa. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-11; p.28, Ls.2-4; p.31, Ls.3-4.) The mere
fact that an on-duty police officer has a holstered weapon during a contact with
an individual is unlikely to be coercive to the degree as to render her subsequent
consent involuntary. If the contrary was true, there could likely be no consensual
encounters between individuals and on-duty police officers.
Finally, the fact that Larosa likely recognized Officer Buhl as the officer
that pulled her over the previous evening does not support her contention that
her consent was coerced. Larosa's previous contact with Officer Buhl was far
from coercive.

Officer Buhl declined to arrest Larosa even after recovering a

syringe that Larosa admitted to injecting methamphetamine with, and after
discovering that Larosa was driving on a suspended license. (Tr., p.10, L.4 p.17, L.24.) In addition, Officer Buhl did not draw his weapon or place Larosa in
handcuffs.

(Tr., p.16, Ls.18-25.) The entire conversation outside the vehicle

lasted only approximately five minutes. (Tr., p.64, Ls.7-9.) There was nothing
about Officer Buhl's actions during the traffic stop that would have caused Larosa
to feel any enhanced intimidation or coercion upon her recognition of Officer Buhl
at her doorstep the next day.
Larosa has failed to show clear error in the district court's factual finding
that she voluntarily consented to the officers' entry to her house and their search
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of a bedroom. This Court should therefore affirm her conviction for possession of
methamphetamine.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered
upon Larosa's conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.
DATED this 23th day of May, 2013.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23 th day of May, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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